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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
MARRIED WOMEN'S CONTRACTS OF
SURETYSHIP
F. EUGENE READER
At common law a married woman had no capacity to contract and her
attempted contracts were altogether void. This was a result of the theory
that by marriage she became one with her husband and her legal existence
was suspended; and of the fact that she had no property in respect of which
she could contract.' The first statutory alteration of this common law rule
in Pennsylvania was the act of 1848,2 which provided that all property
owned by a married woman at the time of her marriage, or acquired there-
after, should remain her separate property. This gave her no general power
to contract, though she could contract, thereunder, to a limited extent with
reference to her separate statutory estate.2 This was followed by a more
liberal statute in 1887,4 conferring upon her a general capacity to contract,
with stated exceptions; which, in turn, was supplanted by the Act of June 8,
1893,5 which, as to her contractual capacity. is the law of Pennsylvania today.
Section two of the Act of 1893 provides:
"Hereafter a married woman may, in the same manner and to the
same extent as an unmarried person, make any contract in writing, of
otherwise, which is necessary, appropriate, convenient or advantageous
to the exercise or enjoyment of the rights and powers granted by the
foregoing section, but she may not become accommodation endorser.
maker, guarantor. or surety Jor another "
*A.B. 1928, The College of Wooster; LL.B. 1931, University of Pennsylvania Law School;
Professor Dickinson School of Law, 1932--
1See I Schouler, "'Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations" (6th Ed,
1921), 239-246; Madden, "Persons and Domestic Relations," 96.
2P. L. 536.
3Pettit v. Fretz's Exec., 33 Pa. 118 (1859); Walker v. Reamy, 36 Pa. 410 (1860).
4P. L. 332,
5P. L. 344, 48 PS. Sect. 32. The first two sections are quoted in full in n. 7 of the
Note: "Right of a Married Woman to Sue Her Husband on Contract," which appears in
this issue of the Law Review.
rThe following states have statutes substantially the same as this: Alabama-Ala.
Code 1907, Sect. 4497; 1923. Sect. 8272 (only forbids suretyship for husband); Georgia-
Civil Code 1910, Sect. 3007; Kentucky-Ky. St., Sect. 2127-28 (for husband only); New
Hampshire--Pub. St. 1891, c. 176. Sect. 2; and Vermont-Act 1884, No. 140, G. L. 3523, as
amended Acts 1919, No. 90 (for husband only). Indiana had such a statute until 1926, when
married women were given capacity to contract as surety-see Burns Ann. St. 1926, Sect.
8738. The same was true of New Jersey, full capacity to contract being conferred in 1927-
see Comp. Stat. N. J,, p. 943; and of the Dist. of Columbia-Code Sect. 1155, repealed Act
May 28, 1926, 44 Stat. 676. The present article will be confined to the law of Pennayl-
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It would seem, at first glance, that little difficulty should be encountered
in determining, in any specific case, whether a married woman was an accom-
modation party or surety in respect to her contractual commitments. How-
ever, a reading of the cases which have orisen since this enactment will read-
ily dispel such a cursory conclusion. It is evident that if she is to be given
the protection against suretyship obligations which the statute assures her the
courts can not be governed by the usual, technical rules of suretyship, but
must look at the realities of the transaction rather than the formalities. The
purpose and intent of the statute would be defeated and its provisions nulli-
fied if it could be circumvented by some formal device whereby apparently
she is a principal, but actually a surety.7 This article is an endeavor to
ascertain what is really meant by an "accommodation endorser, maker", etc.
within the meaning of this provision; and an attempt, by collecting and com-
paring the numerous decisions, to evolve some fairly definite and workable
rules and tests, which may be of assistance in applying the statute to particular
factual situations. It is felt that this can be accomplished most effectively by
considering separately the various typical contractual dealings of married
women and thus, while proceeding, delineate the scope of the statutory rule.
Before embarking upon this process a few observations may be ventured
as to the general effect and purpose of the statute. First it is to be noted that
married women have been given a general capacity to contract, subject only
to the prescribed exceptions. The effect of this is to put the burden of proof
upon the person who wishes to invalidate her contract to show that it comes
within the statutory prohibition. As was said by Justice Dean:
"Formerly her capacity was exceptional and her disability general;
now the disability is exceptional and her capacity general; the burden is
on her, when she seeks to avoid her contract, to bring it within one of the
few exceptions.",,
In connection with this general rule it should be noted that where husband
and wife join in the execution of an obligation, they are prima facie joint
debtors. There is no presumption that either is a surety. Either may show,
as against any party to be affected, in law, by such proof. that he or she is in
vania, but decisions from these jurisdictions are pertinent in determining the meaning of the
Pennsylvania provision and will be cited wherever helpful; and should be consulted when
dealing with problems under the Act of 1893.
7"The form of the obligation is not decisive in determing the liability of a married
woman. If the object be to evade the protection of the statute her liability will be deter-
mined by the fact, not by the form," Keystone Brewing Co. v. Varzaly, 39 Super. 155,159
(1909). See Goldsleger v. Valella, 106 Super. 62 (1932); Muann v. Lorch, 305 Pa. 55
(1931); Brady v. Equitable Trust Co., 199 S. W. 1082 (Ky., 1918).
8Patrick & Co. v. Smith, 165 Pa. 526,528 (1895). Acc: Farmers 6 Merch. Bank v.
Donnelly, 247 Pa. 518 (1915); Wetmore F Morse Granite Co. v. Ryle, 107 A. 109, 112
(Vt. 1919-collecting the cases).
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fact a surety for the other. When the wife does this the Act of i893 makes
her obligation void.0 Another change wrought by this act is that whereas
formerly only her property could ever be subject to her debts and contractual
liabilities, now her obligation is personal and a judgment against her is en-
forced like any other personal judgment.
A further effect of the act must be kept in mind. That is that there is
nothing in the act to prevent her from borrowing money and then turning it
over to her husband, or another, and the wisdom of her act in so doing is nrt
for the courts. There is nothing in the act to protect her from her own im-
providence. So, it has been said:
"This provision applies only to the technical contract of endorse-
ment, guaranty, or suretyship included in the words of the act, and it has
been ruled that while a married woman may not become surety for her
husband there is no law to prevent her paying his debts or giving him
money to use in his business, even though she may have borrowed it."'"
"If the contract was one which the defendant had the power to
make, she was the sole judge of its necessity and of its wisdom. 'If we
concede that it is not necessary, but on the contrary, a foolish expendi-
ture of money, it must be remembered that the Act of Assembly now per-
mits her to do foolish things!' Milligan v. Phipps, 153 Pa. 208.'"
The question as to whether the married woman really borrowed the money
and then turned it over to her husband, or whether in fact he borrowed it and
she pledged her credit for its repayment, is the one which must be answered
in the cases arising under the act. It is a question not always easily answered.
Except in clear cases the question can not be answered satisfactorily with-
out some understanding as to the reason why the Act of 1893 prohibits the
enumerated types of contracts. What was the legislative policy? 12  What is
the purpose, the end to be accomplished by the act? It will be said that it is a
9Algeo v. Fries, 24 Super. 427 (1904); Atkins v. Girst. 44 Super. 310 (1910).
'oNew Phila. L. Ass'n, v. Druian, 101 Super. 62, 64 (1930). The use of the word
"technical" here would seem to be ill-considered. The cases discussed infra clearly show
that she may not be liable, though by the strict technical law of suretyship or nego-
tiable instruments she is not a surety or accommodation party. All that is meant by this
language is that it must appear that in fact she was pledging her credit for another. That
may appear though technically or formally she is a principal debtor.
"Class & Nachod Brewing Co. v. Rago, 53 Super. 418, 424 (1913). Cases in other
jurisdictions are to the same effect; Evans v. Jones, 170 S. E. 541 (Ga. 1933); Van Derslice
v. Merchants Bank, 104 So. 663 (Ala. 1925).
12The writer is not here suggesting what the legislative policy should be. Rather, his
purpose is to attempt to determine what the legislative policy is, in fact. Whether a married
woman still requires or is entitled to some protective restrictions with respect to her con-
tractual dealings, is a question worthy of careful consideration; but that is a matter for the
legislature and until it acts our interest will be in the application of the existing statutory pro-
visons.
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recognition of the belief that a married woman lacks business experience and
hence lacks the judgment and acumen necessary to protect her from imprudent
and foolish dealings which will dissipate her estate. That may have been the
policy back of her common law lack of capacity, but it is not true or h rctUL
1893. It gives her credit for having ordinary business ability, and permits her
to deal with her property and enter into contracts generally. If those contracts
prove to be foolish she is no more to be protected than a man who lacks the
ability to preserve his estate. It may be said, however, that it is one thing to bor-
row money yourself, realizing that you must repay it or lose your property for
the default, while it is an entirely different proposition to merely agree to a con-
tingent liability, arising only if the husband, or other borrower, fails to pay;
and a married woman has sufficient knowledge or experience to understand the
nature of the former, but not the latter type of obligation. We can agree that
there is a difference between the two types of commitments, but not with the
conclusion as to the relation of this difference to a married woman's knowledge.
If she can deal with her property, handle her money, and engage in business
generally on a par with her husband (and the act says she can do that) she
can realize the difference between a primary and a secondary obligation. The
difference goes, not to the state of her business knowledge, but rather to the
relative ease with which a husband, or one close to her, can persuade a married
woman to enter into such a contract."3
The law recognizes that the husband is still, in many respects, the head of
the family; that the wife is still substantially dependent upon him and peculiarly
submissive to his demands and susceptible to his importunities." Most wives
would be slow to refuse to sign on the dotted line when told to do so by their
husbands, especially when he can reassure her that it is his debt and that there
is really no possibility of her having to pay it; and this is true in the absence of
any actual coercion or undue influence. This susceptibility to imposition is not
13That the real reason for these statutes, forbidding suretyship contracts, is because
of the opportunity for the husband to impose upon her, rather than because of any lack of
business judgment on her part, is shown by the fact that several of these statutes confine the
restriction to cases where she is surety for her husband, permitting her to enter into surety-
ship obligations generally. See note 6 supra. And see Simmons v. Marey, 47 S. W. (2nd)
530. 531 (Ky. 1932).
14For example, the defense of condonation in a divorce proceeding Is not enforced so
rigorously against the wife as against the husband; Shackleton v. Shackleton, 21 A. 935 (N.
J. Eq. 1891), where it was said, "Notwithstanding the radical changes which......
have been made respecting the property rights of a married woman, the husband is still, In
many respects, the ruler and his wife his subject." Also, there is still a presumption, despite
the Married Women's Acts, that a crime or tort committed by a wife in the presence of her
husband, is committed under his compulsion and he alone is guilty or liable. Crime: Comm.
v. Dwyer, 29 Co. Ct. 73 (1903); Comm. v. Bore, 13 D. & C. 681 (1930); and note the
charge In Comm. v. Newhard, 3 Super. 215, 217 (1897). Tort: Gelheiser v. Wogniak, 72
Pltts. L. J. 651 (1923).
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confined to importunities by her husband. It applies also, though to a less ex-
tent, to the requests of her children and those close to her in the family rela-
tionship.- Therefore the statute, to protect her from any such impositions,
goes the whole way and prohibits her contracts of suretyship for anyone. The
policy of the statute might then be stated thus: A married woman is on a par
with other adults so far as business experience and judgment is concerned.
Therefore her contracts, in general, are to be given no exceptional treatment
before the law. However she is peculiarly susceptible to the importunities of
others in respect to suretyship obligations. Therefore while we will not pro-
tect her from her own improvidences, we will protect her from bearing the
additional burden of paying for the improvidences of others, which, without
our protection, will likely be imposed upon her. As was said in Harrisburg
National Bank v. Bradshaw:'
"The purpose of the limitation is to protect her from contracts not
connected with the management of her estate and from which she could
derive no advantage. As to contracts relating to her own estate or af-
fairs the existing restraint was removed; it remains as to a class of con-
tracts into which she might be induced or constrained to enter for the
benefit of others."
In determining whether the married woman was the real borrower or merely
a surety, in those cases where by the apparencies of the transaction she is a
principal, we must consider whether she freely entered into the contract, or
on the other hand, did so only as a result of the urgency and insistence of the
person who benefited by it.' 7 It is only where the husband wants the benefit
of the loan (i. e. where he is the real borrower) that he will importune her to
borrow money; hence the fact that a loan has been made as a result of his im-
portunity indicates that the loan was to him and she was but surety thereon.
No discussion is necessary as to those cases where a married woman
is, according to the general law of suretyship or negotiable instruments.
merely an accommodation party to the instrument which she signs; as where
she joins with her husband as co-maker of a note given as a renewal note
for the husband's personal note to which she was not a party.' s It should be
"That the statutory prohibition is needed only as a protection against the urgencies
of their husbands or close relatives is shown by the fact that of all the cases cited in this
article all but two involve a case of suretyship for her husband, while in those two the con-
tract was for the benefit of her son.
16178 Pa. 180. 184 (1896).
'TLanguage to the following effect will be found in several of the cases, "If not given
as surety for her husband, it was given upon his importunity, and to aid him in his busi-
ness, one of the very perils from which the law ought to protect a married woman." Pat-
rick & Co. v. Smith, 165 Pa, 526, 528 (1895).
'gWiltbank v. Tobler, 181 Pa. 103 (1897).
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noticed, however, that where such a direct contract of suretyship exists the
fact that the proceeds were used by the husband for the benefit of the wife's
estate, or to pay a debt she owed, is immaterial. She is still but an accommo-
dation maker on the note.19
Let us then take as our initial situation that which is illustrated by the
case of Newall v. Arnett.20 There the husband owed his partners $9000.
The partners agreed to take his wife's note for the amount and she gave
them her personal note for $9000. Two arguments were advanced to sus-
tain her liability. First, she was not an accommodation party on the note,
for she was the only signer and the only party obligated by it to pay its
amount. Second, a married woman may pay her husband's debts and here
she merely gave her note in payment of his debt. The answer to the first
was that we must look beyond the mere form of the instrument; to the sec-
ond, that the note was not taken as a discharge of his debt, but merely to
secure its payment. She owed the payees nothing and received no consid-
tration or benefit from her note. Hence we have a clear case of an attempt
by a married woman to pledge her credit for the debt of her husband and
her note is void.
A similar attempt is a transaction whereby the wife gives her note "to
secure anything which I may now owe or hereafter be owing to the payee."
The payee is in fact engaged in selling merchandise to her husband for his
business. He charges this to both husband and wife and then takes judg-
ment on her note for the debt incurred. The judgment must be opened for
clearly she was merely pledging her credit to secure payment of her hus-
band's obligations..2 Another example of such direct contract of surety-
ship on her part is where she gives her note as collateral security for the
husband's note, on which he borrowed money.
2 2
Now let us carry our transaction one step further. The wife gives her
note as payment of her husband's debt and the creditor accepts it as a dis-
charge of his obligation. Here it may well be argued that she merely paid
her husband's debt, which the statute allows her to do, and that it cannot
be contended she is merely a surety. for there is no debt running from the
husband to her payee which her note could secure. This argument fails
however to consider the realities of the transaction. True, the debt, as the
husband's, has been discharged. But in fact the same debt of $9000 still
remains and that debt was incurred by the husband, not by the wife. Hence
the wife is pledging her credit to secure the payment of her husband's ante-
l9id., at 108, 109. Atkins v. Girst, 44 Super. 310. 315 (1910).
20279 Pa. 317 (1924).
2lKeystone Brewing Co. v. Varzaly, supra n. 7. Acc: Bank v. Short, 15 Super. 64
(1900). where, as part of the purchase price of stock purchased by the husband, he gave the
seller his wife's note, endorsed by his father.
22Murray v. McDonald, 236 Pa. 26 (1912).
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cedent debt. It is, in effect, a promise to pay the debt of another. She re-
ceives no consideration, or benefit from her note and it is void.2 Here we
may frame a rule. Where a married woman gives her personal obligation
to her husband's creditor as security for his debt, or as payment thereof,
she is a surety only, and her purported obligation void, irrespective of the
form of the instrument evidencing the obligation.
Our transaction may be carried still further. Suppose she gives her
note to her husband's creditor and receives the cash therefor. She then
pays the cash back to the creditor in payment of her husband's debt. Again
the debt of $9000 in fact remains and the creditor has her note for it, so it
would seem she is still but a surety. But there is a further fact here. She
did receive consideration for her note (cash from the creditor), though no
benefit. To decide this case it will first be necessary to digress and make
clear certain fundamental principles and distinctions which may be applic-
able. First we must reiterate (and evaluate) the principle that it is not
necessary that the married woman receive any benefit from her contract in
order that she be held liable thereon as a principal. If she borrows money,
from a person who is not her husband's creditor, and thereafter uses that
money to pay her husband's debt to a third party she is not a surety as to
her borrowing contract.2 4 A second principle is that if the person furnish-
ing her the money, as a part of the contract upon which the money is ad-
vanced, requires that she should at once turn the money over to another,
she is merely surety for the person so receiving it. Here she in fact re-
ceives no consideration (though she may receive the money or check long
enough to transfer it) and no benefit, and the money in fact is being ad-
vanced to the other party on her credit. Such an express agreement cannot
often be shown, but an agreement or understanding to that effect may be
implied from the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Nor will the
lender require it unless he is to get the money or benefit therefrom, directly-
or indirectly. A strong illustration of this principle is found in the case of
Jacquette v. Allabaugh.2' There one J agreed to sell a store to the husband.
23Henry v. Bigley, 5 Super. 503 (1897); Platt, Barber & Co. v. Crawford, 23 Co.
Ct. 148 (1899). The case of Kile v. Kilner, 37 Super. 90 (1908), a four-three decision, can
not be reconciled with this principle.
2o4This is illustrated by the cases cited supra notes 10-12. In the Class Nachod
Brewing Co. case a married woman borrowed money and then gave it to her son to buy a
liquor license. The lower court charged that if she took the money simply to help her son
in his business and had no interest in the business herself, and received no benefit from the
money, then she was substantially going surety for him and not liable on the note. This
was held to be error, upon the above principle. The court pointed out that there was no an-
tecedent debt from the son to the plaintiff to be secured.
2516 Super. 557 (1901). This principle was first enunciated in Patrick and Co. v.
Smith, supra n. 8.
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The husband gave his note for half the price, but could not raise the bal-
ance in cash, as J wanted. So, J, husband and wife agreed to the following
transaction. The wife was to give J her note for the amount of the balance
and he give her his check for that amount. hen she was to endurse the
check over to her husband and he in turn to endorse it over to J and
receive a receipt therefore. The plan was carried out and J took judgment
on her note. This judgment was opened by the lower court and the appel-
late court affirmed, saying:
"At the end of the proceedings the plaintiff had his check
again and also the note of the wife for a like amount. The debt of the
husband was paid by the wife and the property of the wife was liable
under the note for the sum she had paid for her husband. As in Patrick
6 Co. v. Smith it was a transparent device adopted to evade an express
statutory enactment.
'2' 6
This second principle obviously limits the first. The distinction between the
two situations is that in the first the lender parts with his beneficial interest
in the money and gives it to her to use as she pleases. She receives the
consideration in fact and whether she will benefit by it is a matter to be
governed by her own wishes. In the second situation she never has any
beneficial use of the money. The wife is a mere conduit of money which
she obligates herself to repay.
27
Now let us turn back to our third situation and apply these principles.
Since no express agreement on her part is shown (as in the Jacquette case)
the lender, of course, will contend that the first principle applies and that
she is liable since she merely borrowed and received the money and then
used it to pay her husband's debt. But an important fact here is that she
borrowed the money from her husband's creditor. True, if she can borrow
from a third person and then use the money to pay her husband's debt, there
is no reason why she can not accomplish the same end by borrowing from
his creditor. There is nothing in the act to prevent her from having finan-
cial dealings with the same person as her husband. But when she does bor-
row from his creditor and pays that debt, that fact tends strongly to show
that the purpose of the transaction was to have her assume liability for her
husband's indebtedness; and that there was an agreement, or understanding,
among the parties that the money was to be turned back to the creditor.
Certainly where she borrows from the husband's creditor the amount of her
husband's debt and the proceeds are immediately returned to that creditor,
2616 Super., at 560.
27These principles are discussed and the distinction pointed out in the Class & Nachod
Brewing Co. case, supra n. 11. In New Phila. Loan Ass'n. v. Druian, supra n. 10, the
court pointed out that if the money borrowed was placed in the wife's account and she had
full control over the money and used it as she saw fit, the mere fact that she used much of
it to pay his debts would not take away the underlying fact that she was a principal.o
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our natural conclusion is that it was done pursuant to a scheme or device
whereby she was to be colorably the principal, but in fact was to pledge her
credit as security for the husband's debt. Until the contrary is satisfactorily
proved we will treat her as a surety.2  Though we can not say, as a matter
of law, that she is merely a surety whenever such facts are present, the facts
do raise such a presumption and the burden should be upon the lender to
show, by further facts and the preponderance of the evidence, that she bor-
rowed the money free from the importunities of her husband and the lender;
and paid it to him as a matter of choice and not according to any agreement
that the money was to be returned to him. The problem of this third situa-
tion is well stated in Van Derslice v. Merchant's Bank, an Alabama case:
25
"As a general proposition . . . a married woman may borrow
money and give it to her husband directly, or use it in the payment of his
debts, without offending the statute ..... . But where the wife
borrows money from the husband's creditor, giving her own obligation
therefor, and forthwith pays over the money to that creditor in satis-
faction of her husband's debt to him, she indirectly becomes a surety
for her husband's debt within the inhibition of the statute .......
In such a case the law presumes an intention to evade the statute by
the mere substitution of the wife's obligation for that of the husband-
the original debt of the husband remaining in fact unpaid, notwithstand-
ing its change of raiment."
Such an agreement would be inferred only where the lender is a cred-
itor of the husband. One to whom the husband is not indebted would not
be interested in what she did with the money. Further. the lender's agree-
ment when he is the husband's creditor would be confined to a requirement
that she turn the money back to him. or turn it over to her husband, or a
straw man, who in turn had agreed to return it to the creditor (as in
!acquette v. Allabarroh.) Where she immediately eives the money to her
husband and he. in turn. immediately tulrns it back to the lender (in tay-
ment of his debt) it wolild se-em that the nresumntion shold still be that the
rarties inderstood that the husband's debt was to be naid with the, money-
Psneciallv where the loan was oreceded by neqotiation between the hiis-
hand and the lender. However this was what actually occurred in the
Van Derslice case and it was held that the presumntion would not arise on
sluch facts and that the burden of proof was unon the wife to show that that
was the agreement of the parties at the time of the loan.
28Query: Suppose she borrows an amount in excess of the husband's debt and re-
turns the amount of his debt, using the balance for herself? Of course she would not be
surety as to the amount in excess of his debt; but would the larger borrowing affect the
presumption of suretyship? The Van Derslice case, infra a. 29, says "no."
29104 So. 663, 666 (Ala. 1925).
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The contractural dealings of married women may be classified roughly
as of two types - those where she contracts with a creditor of her hus-
band, and those where she contracts with a person to wiom no antecedent
debt is due from her husband. The problems presented by each type are
substantially dissimilar. Thus far we have been dealing with the former
type. Proceeding to those cases where the husband owed no debt to the
lender when the loan to the wife was made, the case of Oswald v. Jonesao
will serve as a type transaction. There the husband applied to the plaintiff
for a loan, for the purpose of financing his entry into the hotel business, and
offered his wife and one X as sureties on his note. The plaintiff refused but
said that he would loan the money to the wife if the husband was eliminated
from the transaction. Thereupon the husband had his wife sign a note,
which X endorsed, and the plaintiff accepted this and made out a check for
the amount payable to the wife. She endorsed the check over to her hus-
band and he used the proceeds to set himself up in business. The facts
showed that the plaintiff and the wife were at no time face to face with each
other in the transaction, the husband carrying on the negotiations with her.
Declarations were made by the plaintiff after the loan wherein he referred
to the loan as Mr. Jones' loan and the plaintiff's own testimony showed that
he treated it as a loan to the husband. On a suit against the wife on her
note the question as to whether she was surety or principal was submitted
to the jury and the verdict was for the plaintiff. On motion for judgment
n. o. v. the lower court entered judgment for the defendant and this was
affirmed on appeal. The per curiam opinion is too brief and its language
too general to be of substantial aid in our development of general principles
and a fuller and more analytical discussion of the case is warranted.
What is the problem in this case? Several arguments may be advanced
to differentiate this from the cases already discussed and to sustain the de-
fendant's liability as principal. First it is said there was no debt running
from the husband to the plaintiff upon which the wife could be surety and a
suretyship contract must have a principal debtor. Second, the plaintiff did
not require as a part of the loan contract that the defendant should turn over
the money to her husband. So far as the facts show it was immaterial to
him what she did with the money. though he did know that she intended to
give it to her husband. Nor could we infer such an agreement. Where the
lender is not a creditor of the husband he has no purnose to serve in requir-
ing the wife to turn over the money to her husband. Third, a married woman
may borrow money and give it to her husband and that is all that the de-
fendant did here. Answering these briefly: the first is true, looking to the
form of the transaction, but we must look to the substance; admitting the
80254 Pa. 32 (1916). Reference has been made to the paper books to complete the
facts.
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second to be true, such an agreement, though making her an accommodation
party, is not necessary to make her such; the third assumes the fact to be
proved, viz. that the wife was the borrower. The decision in this case de-
pends upon the answer to one question: who was the real borrower, the hus-
band or the wife? This suggests a further question: what is meant by the
* 'real borrower"? If the question is left to the jury as to who is the real bor-
rower what should they interpret this to mean; what should be their guide
or test? Should it be used in its popular sense, as meaning the person who
gave the note and received the check for it? If so the case is over and the
defendant is liable-and incidentally the purpose and policy of the act is
vitiated. The interpretation of the phrase and the answer to the question
must be governed by the policy underlying the statutory prohibition. We
must look for the "real borrower" in the statutory sense, not in the popular
sense of the word. The policy of the act is to protect a married woman from
entering into personal obligations benefitting another because of the impo-
sitions or deceits of others. Therefore if it is found that the husband wants
to borrow money for his personal use; that to obtain it he importunes his
wife to borrow it and turn the money over to him, then, in fact, he is the
real borrower and she but the surety.
Now let us determine who was the real borrower in this case before us.
First, we find that the husband attempted to borrow the money from the
plaintiff himself and was refused. This of itself indicates that the husband
was the real borrower; and with the additional fact that the plaintiff sug-
gested that he loan the money to the wife after eliminating the husband from
the transaction, we can reasonably infer that the husband thereupon exerted
his powers upon his wife and urged her to make the loan for him. Of course
this is but an inference and not conclusive. A married woman may of her
own volition borrow money and give it to her husband, and there is no rea-
son why she could not do this after he had made an attempt to borrow it him-
self. However, in the absence of a showing that she acted voluntarily and
free from his imposition the inference from these facts is compelling that he
was the real borrower and that she pledged her credit for a loan to him; and
that the whole transaction was a mere device to evade the statute31
311t should be noted that the fact that she borrowed from the the same person to whom
the husband applied for a loan is not controlling in raising this inference. If the husband
attempts to borrow from A, or from A and B, and then the wife borrows from C. it would
still leave the impression that she borrowed from C only because her husband could not raise
the money and insisted upon her borrowing it for him. The fact that she borrows from A
and that A suggested this to the husband strengthens our inference, and makes A a party
to the imposition, or, at least, puts him on notice that the husband is the real borrower. But
such knowledge by the lender is immaterial in determining whether she was surety, as will
be shown in the discussion on estoppel, infra. However, in such a case it is more likely
that the wife herself will negotiate with C for the loan. The effect of this is considered In
the discussion to follow, particularly with reference to Scott v. Bedell.
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A further fact is that the plaintiff and defendant were at no time face to
face with each other in the whole transaction. Where the husband makes
all the arrangements for the loan, the wife's only part in the transaction being
to sign the note and turn over the check to her husband, again our natural
inference is that the husband was the real borrower. This too is not con-
clusive. If the wife, free from imposition, makes a loan and receives the
proceeds to use as she pleases, the fact that she had her husband act as her
agent in procuring and arranging the loan would not alter the fact that she
was the principal 3 2 On the other hand, even though the wife deals with the
lender face to face she might well be a surety; as where she took part in the
negotiations wherein a colorable scheme to avoid the act was evolved -2 or
where she is brought to the lender by her husband according to a pre-ar-
ranged plan of lender and husband to make her ostensibly the principal.
2
4
At least in the absence of an affirmative showing that the wife acted of her
own volition and was to have the beneficial use of the money our conclusion
should be that she merely signed the instrument to enable the husband to
borrow the money himself. Therefore in the case of Oswald v. Jones there
are cumulative inferences that the husband was the real borrower and, with
the additional fact that the plaintiff recognized him as the real borrower, the
court properly held, as a matter of law, upon the evidence, that the defend-
ant was merely an accommodation party and not liable32
The case of Kemper v. Richardson3" presents almost identical facts, ex-
cept that it was a son who applied for the loan and that the plaintiff went to
see the mother at her home where she signed the note. The proceeding was
one by the mother to open the judgment taken against her on the note and
the Superior Court, reversing the lower court, ordered that the rule to open
the judgment be made absolute. The court pointed out that the circumstances
showed the real borrower to be the son and used the following language:
"A jury could fairly find'that the device in this case was a trans-
parent attempt to make the mother surety or guarantor for the money
her son was borrowing from Kemper. The law . . . places a bar-
rier around a married woman to protect her from all kinds of deceit and
impositions. . . . He (the plaintiff) did know sufficient facts to
advise him that he was furnishing the money upon the importunities of
W. E. Richardson to aid him in his personal business, which is one of
the very perils from which the law ought to protect a married woman.
32New Phila. Loan Ass'n, v. Druian, supra n. 10.
33As in Jacquette v. Allabaugh, discussed supra; cited supra n. 25.
U'See Manor Nat. Bank v. Lowery, 242 Pa. 559 (1914).
35Acc: Hines & Co. v. Hays, 82 S. W. 1007 (Ky. 1909). Contra: lona Savings
Bank v. Boynton, 39 A. 522 (N. H. 1897).
s872 Super. 115 (1919). And see Goldsleger v. Velella, 106 Super. 65 (1932) - a
similar case, quoting from the Kemper case at length.
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. . . There was no contractual capacity in Mrs. Richardson to
bind herself by a note for the payment of the money which Kemper
loaned to her son. The evidence taken in connection with the circum-
stances of the case admits of no other interpretation."
' 3 7
It will be noted that the court did not hold that she was not liable as a mat-
tern of law, but that it was a question of fact for the jury. The fact that the
mother did deal directly with the plaintiff differentiates it from the Oswald
case. Where it appears that upon the husband's failure to procure a loan
the wife herself thereafter negotiated for a loan and arranged personally to
borrow the money from the person who refused him, these facts indicate that
it was her own independent contract; that it was a casq of her borrowing the
money and then turning it over to her husband. This would conflict with the
inference to be drawn from the fact of his attempted loan and it would be a
question of fact for the jury as to who, on all the evidence and from all the
circumstances, was the real borrower. However when we consider the fact
that in the Kemper case the lender came to her and the brief meeting was
arranged by the son, after and pursuant to his negotiations with the lender,
and at the latter's suggestion, any significance attached to the fact she dealt
face to face with the plaintiff would seem to be removed. From all the un-
disputed facts and circumstances it would certainly seem that a directed ver-
dict for the defendant would have been proper had suit been brought on the
note, and the court was evidently of that opinion, as shown by the last sen-
tence quoted above. The language relative to the function of the jury is
explained by the fact that the appellate court was merely passing upon the
right of the defendant to open the judgment and put in her defence.
This brings us to the case of Scott v. Bedell.", In it the proceeding
was a rule by Mrs, Bedell to open the judgment entered on a judgment note by
Scott against Mr. and Mrs. Bedell. Briefly, the facts were as follows. The
husband, who was financially embarrassed, wanted to go into business and
had an opportunity to purchase a saloon in New York. He consulted Scott,
an attorney, who agreed to advance $5500 pursuant to an arrangement
whereby a judgment note signed by the wife and husband payable to Scott
was given to Scott; and another note was given to Scott, signed by the
husband and payable to and endorsed by one G. The latter was given
to aid Scott in raising the money and need not be considered further
here. Scott then sent two checks to the husband in New York; one
for $4000 payable to the seller of the saloon; and the other for $500
payable to the husband. The other $1000 represented the plaintiff's
fee. The wife took part in the negotiations with the plaintiff and G. There was
3772 Super., at 118.
38269 Pa. 167 (1920).
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no conflict in the evidence on these facts. As to the nature and extent of her
participation in the transaction there was conflicting evidence. Competent evi-
dence was introduced by Scott which showed that she had talked to Scott,
and told him she was anxious to set her husband up in business; that she
called on G and asked him to go on the note; and that she knew she was the
principal maker and if there was anything to lose she would be the loser.
The lower court found as a fact that she was the borrower and discharged
the rule.3 9 This was affirmed on appeal.
It will be noted that this case was similar to Oswald v. Jones in that the
husband consulted Scott first; and that case was cited by the petitioner as
controlling. Though it does not appear that the husband himself tried to
borrow the money from Scott he did consult him as to how it could be raised
and the inference would be that he was the real borrower, and she a party
to a device imposed upon her. However it differs from the Oswald case in
that here the wife took part in the negotiations. As pointed out above, this
indicates that she herself was the borrower and, the inferences being con-
flicting, it becomes a question of fact from all the evidence and circumstances
as to whether she was the real borrower. It being a question of fact there
was ample evidence td show that she was anxious to borrow the money and
that she, of her own free will, conducted the negotiations and borrowed the
money so that she could give it to him to use in his business. On these facts
she was the principal debtor. As the court said:
"Oswald v. Jones, relied upon by appellant, is plainly distinguish-
able on its facts from the case now before us. There the court below
found that the person who loaned the money and the married woman,
who gave the note, 'were at no tine face to face with each other in the
transaction'; whereas, here the evidence shows that Mrs. Bedell, her-
self, was active in obtaining the loan. Again, in that case, the trial
court found as a fact that the husband was the real borrower, while in
this case the opposite fact is found, on ample evidence.
' ' 4
0
The petitioner stressed the fact that the lender knew the money was to
be used for the benefit of her husband. This alone could have no weight.
Since a married woman may borrow money and give it to her husband the
9The facts do not appear in opinion and have been taken from the paper books.
40269 Pa. at 169. The language to the effect that the court in Oswald v. Jones
found, as a fact, that she was a surety, is somewhat confusing. The question as to whether
she is surety or principal is a question of law. The function of the jury is to find as a fact
whether she was the real borrower; i. e, whether she, free from imposition, made the loan
and received the beneficial interest in the money. If it so finds, on competent evidence, she, is
the principal debtor and liable; and judgment should be entered on the verdict for the plain-
tiff. However, in the Oswald case there was no evidence from which the jury could so find.
Hence the court, as a matter of law, entered judgment n. o. v. for the defendant.
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fact that the lender knew that was her intention could scarcely be said to
change her contract into one of suretyship." Petitioner also contended she was
merely a surety because she never handled any of the money, the proceeds of
the loan going directly to the husband from the lender. However, the fact
that she ordered the lender to pay over the money to her husband, instead
of going through the formality of having it pass through her hands, would
not make it his debt. 42 In other words, if she had gone to Scott first and ar-
ranged for a loan and then turned the money over to her husband she would
clearly have been a principal. That being so, the fact that Scott knew of her
intention, or that she ordered him to turn it over to her husband for her,
would not alter the case. The inference deductible from the fact that Mr.
Bedell went to Scott first having been overcome by clear evidence, that is
our case. It must be remembered that she was not dealing with her hus-
band's creditor and hence it can not be said she was assuming liability for
his indebtedness to another.
This consideration of the typical fact situations and the cases dealing
therewith has indicated the problems met in applying the statute. Also, it is
hoped, the discussion has developed and evaluated the applicable rules and
principles to an extent sufficient to serve as a'guide to the proper approach
to any different or more involved transaction that may present itself for
solution. No further analysis will be attempted. However a brief refer-
ence to a few miscellaneous cases will serve to round out the discussion.
Several cases have arisen where husband and wife gave a note or bond
for a loan, the proceeds of which were used to purchase, to pay off a mort-
gage on, or to improve real estate conveyed to or held by them as tenants
by the entireties. Of course, if the husband borrows money and the wife
joins in the note as a technical accommodation party, the fact that he used
the proceeds to improve their joint property would not change her status to
that of principal. 43 However where she signs the instrument as co-maker,
knowing that it is to raise money for one of these purposes, and it is so
used, she can scarcely contend that she was only a surety: by showing, for
example, that her husband conducted the negotiations and she never saw any
of the money. She receives a direct consideration for the loan and signs it as
maker to conserve her own property interest and to accomplish a purpose of
her own. The fact that she is directly interested for her own purpose in the
transaction is the determining factor, and that being the case she is liable
41On this point the court quoted from Yeany v. Shannon, 256 Pa. 135 (1917). Acc:
Bell v. Farmer's Nat. Bank, 106 So. 851 (Ala. 1925); Edwards v. Warnell, 170 S. E. 365
(Ga. 1933).
4S2See: Kemper v. Weidler, 23 Dist. '53, 454 (1914); Hill v. Cooley, 37 S. E. 109
(Ga. 1900).
43See: Wiltbank v. Tobler, supra n. 18, and explanatory discussion thereto.
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as a principal debtor. 4 The same conclusion has been reached as to a joint
note given in payment of rent for property leased jointly by husband and
wife."1 Our discussion would not be complete without a reference to the
recent case of Munn v. Lorch."4 which involved an ingenious device to evade
the statute. There the Lorch brothers were refused a loan by the bank to
their corporation. Then the bank and the brothers evolved a plan for se-
curing the loan. Pursuant to it each brother's wife subscribed for stock in
the company and gave her note therefor. Then the company endorsed the
notes over to the bank as collateral for the loan. Of course the decisions
centered upon the question as to whether the subscription agreements were
valid. If it was a bona fide agreement the wives were debtors of the com-
pany and liable on their notes. If it was a mere colorable transaction to
enable the company to pledge the notes for the loan, it never being intended
to issue the stock as consideration for the notes, it was simply a case of their
giving their notes as collateral security for the debt of another and the notes
were void. The question was so submitted to the jury and it found, on ample
evidence, for the defendant. The judgment entered on the verdict was prop-
erly affirmed. With this we will leave the problem of what constitutes a
suretyship obligation and proceed to those further problems which arise after
it has been determined she was but a surety on her contract.
ESTOPPEL
In all of the cases thus far discussed the plaintiff was a party to the whole
transaction and hence knew that the wife was merely a surety if such was the
fact. In such a case, even though the wife certified in the instrument that she
was borrowing the money for her personal benefit and estate and not as an ac-
commodation party, the plaintiff could not plead estoppel, since he knew the
facts were otherwise and was not misled.47 Where, however, the married
woman, by the form of the instrument or express representations, leads the
lender to believe that she is the principal and the lender in good faith ad-
4"Morris v. Duer, 90 Super. 285 (1927); Kaufman v. Lehman, 94 Super. 306, (1928);
Humphreys v. Logan, 242 Pa. 427 (1913). A fortiori she is liable on her note given as pay-
ment for property conveyed to her. However, if her husband is the real purchaser and the
property is put in her name merely to enable him to avoid his creditors, her signing a note
given in payment of the purchase price would be a suretyship obligation. She would be
pledging her credit to secure his purchase debt. If she does not know that the property is
put in her name and give her consent to it, she has incurred no debt for the purchase price
and her note given for the price is invalid. See Ponevyezh B. 6 L. Ass'n. v. Shandelman,
170 A. 340, Pa. Super. Ct. (1934). distinguishing Stahr v. Brewer, 186 Pa. (1898).
45Slater v. Chiccarino, 109 Super. 353 (1933); and see Le Goullon v. Greer. 15 D. 6
C. 583 (1930).
48305 Pa. 55 (1931).
4'Pine Brook Bank v. Kearney, 303 Pa. 223 (1931); First Nat. Bank v. Rutter, 104
A. 138 (N. J. L. 1918); Crumbaugh v. Postell, 49 S. W. 334 (Ky. 1899).
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vances the money in reliance thereon, the question is presented as to whether
she is estopped to deny that she was the borrower and to show that she merely
signed for the accommodation of another. At common law it was held that a
married woman could not be liable on her note or bond even though she rep-
resented at the time of giving it that she was single. The reason was that she
had no legal capacity to contract and therefore could not, by her own acts.
confer upon herself a power which the law denied her. It was said, "As in
the case of infancy, it is not a question of privilege, but of legal incapacity to
contract, that stands in the way of the plaintiff's recovery on the bond."'"
Again, "Legal incapacity can not be removed even by fraudulent representa-
tion, so as to create an estoppel in the act to which the incapacity relates.""'
That being the principle applicable to total incapacity it would seem
necessarily to follow that the same principle must be applied to those contracts
of suretyship which the statute expressly prohibits the wife to incur. The
statute has removed her general incapacity to contract, but it has not removed
the bar as to her accommodation obligations. She is still incapable of con-
tracting this type of contract and therefore can not give herself the capacity
by her own representations. If it were held otherwise the statute designed
for the protection of married women would be rendered wholly ineffective.
The leading case on this point is Farmington Nat. Bank v. Buzzell,10 where it
was held that she could not be estopped. The reason is well stated in the
following excerpt from the opinion:
"The proviso in the statute is, in effect, a reenactment of the com-
mon-law disability of a married woman to be a surety for her husband.
Concealment, fraud, or falsehood as to her relation to the con-
tract, cannot confer capacity on her so as to entitle the plaintiffs to an
action against her on the contract. . . . Her disqualification as a
party to a contract prevents the application of an estoppel; otherwise it
could be said that though she cannot make a contract because of her in-
capacity, when she attempts to make one by fraud or misrepresentations,
legal ability is in some way conferred by estoppel; that is, she is not qual-
ified to make a contract for herself, but is liable on one that she unsuc-
cessfully tries to make. . . . In cases of torts she may be estopped
to deny that her representations are true; but in such cases her legal in-
capacity to bind herself by contract is not denied or qualified, and is not
material as a ground of defence."st
48Keen v. Coleman, 39 Pa. 299, 302 (1861).
49Innis v. Templeton, 95 Pa. 262. 268 (1880).
-60 N. H. 189 (1880).
5lAs to this last proposition, a married woman may of course be estopped by her
conduct in reference to transactions she has legal power to perform. So she could be es-
topped by conduct independent of contract (such as by telling X that her property belongs
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With the exception of Indiana5 2 this case has been followed in the other juris-
dictions having this type of statute." It should also be noted that the parol
evidence rule would not preclude her evidence of suretyship, despite her certi-
fication to the contrary, on the instrument. Such a certification is not an inte-
gral part of the contract upon which her obligation is founded, and, further,
this evidence is not introduced to vary the terms of a written contract, but to
show that, as to her, there was no contract."4
There seems to be no appellate court decision in Pennsylvania directly
deciding this question. However, the language and general tenor of the cases
is significant. In Wiltbank v. Tobler" 5 the court, in construing the effect of
the Act of 1893, said. "This species of liability she is still unable to incur, and
hence her inability to make such contracts must be adjudged upon the same
principles and authorities that were applicable prior to the new legislation."
In Murray v. McDonald" the wife gave her note, concluding with a certifica-
tion that it was for her personal use and not made as an accommodation party,
to the plaintiff. It was given as collateral for the husband's note, given to the
plaintiff for his own personal loan. The plaintiff, knowing this, could not
have been misled by her statement and the doctrine of estoppel was not ap-
plicable.5 7 However the court treated it as a case where estoppel could
ordinarily be pleaded and concluded that estoppel could not be pleaded
against a married woman, saying:
"But no conclusion, however adverse to the wife with respect to this
feature of the case (certification) can influence our determination of the
controversy. The judgment was not opened to permit her to show a
claim to equitable relief, for she had asserted none, and had none.
to her husband and X, in reliance thereon, buys it from the husband). or by her misrepre-
sentations in her contracts where she is a principal. See Grim's Appeal, 105 Pa. 375, 385
(1884); L. R. A. 1916 C, 240.
-5Wright v. Fox, 103 N. E. 422 (Ind. 1913)-where the court indulged in some
sophistry in attempting to explain away the paradox of asserting that a void note may be
rendered valid by the application of an equitable principle. Trinkle v. L. B. L. F. 8 S.
Ass'n., 117 N. E. 542 (Ind. 1917).
53Bank v. Pride, 79 So. 255 (Ala. 1918); Peoples Bank v. Baker, 38 S. W. (2d)
225 (Ky. 1931); First National Bank of Belmar v. Shumard, 103 A. 1001 (N. J. L. 1918)-
where the wife represented to the plaintiff that she was a widow. Barton v. Bickford, 122
A. 582 (Vt. 1923) is often cited as contra to this principle. In it estoppel was permitted,
however, only because a third party was joint maker with her, and by the statute she
could be surety except for her husband. A later case, confined the estoppel to that precise
situation and held she could not be estopped where she was a party to a contract with her
husband; Nat. Bank v. Hole, 129 A. 155 (Vt. 1925).
64Pine Brook Bank v. Kearney, supra n. 47; Nat. Bank v. Hole. supra n. 53.
5Supra n. 18.
e6Supra n. 22.
OTSee the cases supra n. 47.
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It was opened solely because the transaction as exhibited in her applica-
tion was one not only contravening public policy, but one which offended
against a positive statute. . . . Unless the principle here asserted is
to prevail in cases like the present, the statutory prohibition against a
married woman becoming surety for her husband would be of no effect,
and the policy of the law in this regard liable to circumvention by
flimsiest device.' ' s
Though not a square decision on the point, this case leaves no room for doubt
as to what the law is in Pennsylvania. She can not be estopped
s9
NEGOTIABLE INSTRLIMENTS
Having determined that a married woman may not be estopped by her
misrepresentations, a further question arises as to whether, when she is a
party to a negotiable instrument, she may avoid liability as against a holder in
due course, by showing that she was merely an accommodation party (there
being nothing in the instrument to show this). It is possible to hold that she
may not, without being inconsistent with the estoppel doctrine, by adopting
the theory that a holder in due course takes an instrument free from all de-
fences available between the original parties." Incapacity to contract,
natural or legal, was recognized at common law as a real defence; i. e. a de-
fence which is not cut off by the transfer of a negotiable instrument to a holder
in due course. The most common examples of legal incapacity, under this
principle, were presented by the case of lunatics, infants, and married women
(under their common law disability)."' Whether this principle is applicable
to the suretyship contracts of a married woman, under the statutory provision
before us, presents a two-fold problem. First, does a married woman lack the
legal capacity to enter into a contract of suretyship, in the same sense that
she lacked capacity to contract at all at common law? Second, if that is the
case, is there anything in the Negotiable Instruments Law which has changed
58236 Pa., at 29-30. In Atkins v. Girst, supra n. 9. a similar case, it was said that
such a declaration was entitled to weight in the absence of evidence that it was a mere de-
vice adopted to evade the statute. Evidence to contradict it was admitted and considered in
determining whether she was in fact surety or principal.
59in Platt, Barber & Co. v. Crawford, 23 Co. Ct. 148 (1899), it was held that a married
woman could not be estopped because of any conduct on her part subsequent to entry of judg-
ment on her note. The opinion is well reasoned and discusses at length the question of es-
toppel as against a married woman.
COThe rule in Alabama is that she can not be estopped but is liable to a holder in
due course. However these decisions are not based upon the theory suggested, but upon
the principle that her lack of power is not a real defence, which is necessarily inconsistent
with the estoppel doctrine. See th language quoted itfra n. 68.
elSee Bigelow. Bills, Notes, and Checks (3rd. Ed. 1928) p. 425, (coverture); Joyce,
Defences to Commercial Paper (2nd. Ed. 1924), Sect. 105.
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the common law rule? The first question has been answered in the affirma-
tive, in the discussion on estoppel. The basis of those decisions was her
complete lack of capacity to enter into a suretyship contract. To answer the
second we must turn to the N. 1. L.
There is no express provision in the N. I. L. relative to incapacity to con-
tract as a real defence.12 It might be argued that the broad language of Sect.
5763 demonstrates a change of policy in the law, in favor of the free circula-
tion of negotiable paper, and intends to exclude from liability only persons
who have been discharged by payment, or release, or by lack of proper pro-
ceedings to dishonor .6 4  However other sections of the Act indicate an inten-
tion to preserve lack of capacity as a real defence. For example, Sect. 22 ' 3
provides that an assignment by an infant passes the property therein "not-
withstanding that from want of capacity . . . . the infant may incur no
liability thereon." Thus the infant's incapacity remains a defence to a holder
in due course. It may be said that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius applies and hence the act excludes want of capacity in others as a real
defence. However, Sect. 65 (3)6" provides that every person negotiating an
instrument warrants "that all prior parties had capacity to contract". Why
such a warranty if lack of capacity to contract would be no defence to the
holder? In view of these sections it would not be improper to conclude that
no change in the common law rule was intended. Further, the proviso in the
Act of 1893 was intended to carry out a definite public policy to absolve mar-
ried women from liability on this type of contract. The N. I. L.. should not
be construed as changing that policy, in the absence of a clearly expressed in-
tention to that effect. To hold that she may be liable on negotiable instru-
ments would be to defeat materially that policy.
The authority 6n this question is scarce. Two jurisdictions hold that
suretyship is no defence against a holder in due course. In Alabama it was
held, prior to the N. I. L.,6 7 that if a married woman signed a note with her
62Tle English Bills of Exchange Act provides in Sect. 22 (1): "Capacity to incur
liability as a party to a bill is co-extensive with capacity to contract." This provision was
not incorporated into the N. 1, L.
63"A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defects of title of prior
parties, and free from defences available to prior parties among themselves, and may en-
force payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof agjainst all parties liable there-
on." 56 P. S. Sect. 137.
r4See Bigelow, supra n. 61, at p. 407, n. 1; Brannon. The Negotiable Instruments
Law (5th ed. 1932), p. 558.
6556 P. S. Sect. 27.
6656 P. S. Sect. 156. This section was constructed in Young's Estate, 234 Pa. 287 (1912)
where it was held that the endorser of a note could not deny the capacity of the maker (a
married woman) to defeat his liability as endorser. Other sections of the act are similar:
see Sects. 60-62, 56 P. S. Sects. 151-153.
I7Scott v. Taul, 22 So. 447 (Ala. 1897).
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husband as co-maker, she was not estopped as to the payee, but her defence
was cut off by negotiation. The court merely applied the general rule that a
holder in due course takes an instrument free from defences available between
the original parties. This rule was reaffirmed, reluctantly, in two cases de-
cided after the N. I. L. was adopted .6  The situation is the same in Georgia,
the early case saying that a contract was valid after negotiation unless both
illegal and immoral, and that her surety contracts were not immoral. D  (This
rule would eliminate any type of lack of capacity as a real defence.) These
cases do not help us any on the problem as to the effect of the N. I. L., for
they do not hold that that Act has changed the rule that lack of capacity is a
real defence. Rather, they merely show that the statutory prohibition against
suretyship was construed to create a personal defence only, which defences
are not available against a holder in due course either under the law merchant
or the N. I. L. They are inconsistent with our rules as to estoppel, which is
based upon the wife's lack of capacity to contract as surety-a real defence.
Three jurisdictions take a contrary view. 0 In commenting upon the effect of
the N. I. L. it was said, in a Vermont case.
7 1
"That statute has nothing to do with the policy of the state as to the
contractual rights, privileges and liabilities of a married woman. . .
The N. I. L. presupposes the paper to be such as the parties are in law
capacitated to make and the courts to enforce."
Thus the only authority really in point holds that the N. I. L. has made no
change in the common law rule that lack of capacity is a real defence.
The only case on the negotiable instrument question in Pennylvania is
Bank v. Short,7z which was decided prior to the adoption of the N. 1. L. There
a bank sued a married woman on a note, on which she vWas the maker, which
it had purchased before maturity in the usual course of business. The trial
court charged that if the note was in effect given for the husband's debt it was
absolutely null and void. It refused plaintiff's requested charge that "if the
jury find . . . . that the plaintiff became the owner and holder of the
68Davies v. Simpson, 79 So. 48 (Ala. 1918); Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v.
Howell, 79 So. 377 (Ala. 1918), where the court said, "Although the result may be a
material emasculation of the statute prohibiting suretyship by the wife ...... .and
although that decision may be inconsistent with the established theory that the wife's con-
tracts of suretyship are per se void, we nevertheless feel bound to adhere to the principle
declared in Scott v. Taul."
6OPerkins v. Rowland. 69 Ga. 661 (1882); followed, after adoption of N. I. L., in
Mercer v. Raybon, 148 S. E. 749 (Ga. 1929).
70Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Fisher, 129 A. 927 (Vt, 1925); Wetmore & Morse Granite
Co. v. Ryle, 107 A. 109 (Vt. 1919); Schwartz v. Sacks. 2 Fed. (2nd) 188 (1924-construind
the statute of the Dist. of Col.); Peoples Nat. Bank v. Schepflin, 62 A. 333 (N. J. L. 1905).
7"Nat. Bank of Newbury v. Hale, 129 A. 155, 157 (Vt. 1925).
7215 Super. 64 (1900).
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negotiable note in question for value, before maturity, in the regular course of
business, without notice of the defence now attempted to be made thereto, the
verdict must be for the plaintiff." The Superior Court affirmed the judgment
for the defendant, saying:
"The proviso of (the Act of 1887) and the positive declaration (in
the Act of 1893) . . . . leaves the instrument on which this suit is
founded subject to the common law defences of a married woman.
Under the facts, as determined by the verdict, it was absolutely void for
the reason that she had no power to make such an accommodation note.
The plaintiff's cashier, when he purchased this note for the
bank, knew that the defendant was a married woman, and if he had
made inquiry at that time he would have learned that she was an accom-
modation maker on this note, for her husband. . . . So given, the
note was absolutely void, it being of a kind expressly prohibited by the
Act of Assembly. -
7
3
From the opinion it is difficult to say whether the ground of the opinion was
that the plaintiff, due to its knowledge that she was married, was not a holder
in due course; or was that her suretyship was a real defence. In view of the
lower court's charge, which was affirmed, and the language employed, to the
effect that her contract was void, the latter would seem to have been the basis
of the decision. Furthermore it is doubtful whether the court could have
properly treated the plaintiff as other than a holder in due course. Prima
facie when a married woman signs a note as maker she is the debtor, and the
tranferee's mere knowledge that she is married would not put him on notice
that she is also a surety.
4
It would seem that the only proper rule which the court could have ap-
plied was that her suretyship was a real defence. In view of the repeated
language of the courts to the effect that a married woman's contract of surety-
ship must be treated in the same manner as her contracts at common law, and
the decisions that her incapacity prevents an estoppel; it is a proper conclusion
that negotiation can not breathe life into her void contracts, nor confer a
capacity which does not exist. Suretyship being a real defence under the
Act of 1893, there is nothing in the N. I. L. which compels, nor indicates, a
change in that principle. Nor should this clearly defined public policy be en-
raid., at 67, 68.
74See the cases supra n. 9. In Birmingham T. & S. Co. v. Howell supra n. 68. where
the wife was a co-maker with her husband, the court cited the rule that prima facie, they
are joint debtors and said, "It follows that knowledge by a transferee of the fact that the
joint makers of a negotiable note are husband and wife does not put him on notice that the
wife is but a surety, and hence does not affect the defence of holder in due course."
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croached upon by implication from any general language employed in that
Act.7
5
RENEWAL NOTES
Special reference should be made to the cases on renewal notes. Where
a woman becomes an accommodation party to an instrument while she is
single and after her marriage signs a renewal note, in the same capacity, she
is liable upon the renewal note. Harrisburg National Bank v. Bradshaw"A so
held and the reason for her liability is well stated in the opinion:
"The defendant was liable on the endorsement of the note which
became due two months after her marriage. True, her liability was con-
ditional only, but it would have been fixed and made absolute by protest
and notice. By the renewal of her indorsement she did not enter into
a new obligation for the benefit of another, but she continued and extend-
ed for her own benefit an existing obligation by which she was bound.
By so doing she did not become an accommodation endorser and enter
into a new forbidden contract. The contract already existed and its
continuance was for the relief and benefit of her estate .........
The renewal of an obligation contracted before marriage, we think, does
not come within the meaning of the Act, although the obligation may be-
long to the prohibited class.-
77
By reversing the situation a different problem is presented. That is, a mar-
ried woman gives her note as collateral security for her husband's debt and,
after discoverture, gives a renewal note to take up her original one. Here
the question is simply whether there was any consideration for her renewal
note. Prior to the Acts of 1887 and 1893 it was held that if a married woman
contracted a debt during coverture, though it was invalid, it imposed a moral
obligation upon her, which was sufficient to support her promise to pay it
made after discoverture T8 Upon the same theory it was held that where
she gave a note, as principal, prior to the Act of 1887 and a renewal note
after that Act, but during coverture, she was liable on the renewal note. 9
7
51n Martin v. Hess, 23 Dist. 195 (1914) it was held that a negotiable note given in
payment of a gambling debt was absolutely void, under the Act of 1794. and that the N. I. L.
did not repeal this act by implication. In discussing the effect of the N. I. L. the court said
it only applies to paper that it was legally possible for the parties to make. "The construc-
tion sought for by the plaintiff would likewise repeal existing laws for the protection of in-
fants, married women, and insane persons; and it is evident that such was not the intention
of the legislature."
76178 Pa. 180 (1896).
77id., at 184.
78Hemphill v. McClimans, 24 Pa. 367 (1855).
70Brooks v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 125 Pa. 394 (1889).
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In Rathfon v. Locher"' this doctrine of moral consideration was applied to
her accommodation paper given during coverture and she was held liable
on her renewal note given after the termination of her marriage.
81
MORTGAGE OR PLEDGE OF PROPERTY
A married woman had the power in Pennsylvania from earliest times
to convey or mortgage her real property, by complying with certain require-
ments as to the husband's joinder, separate acknowledgement, etc. Early
cases held that since she could sell or mortgage her realty and give the
money received to her husband or another she could subject her estate to a
contingent liability for the same purpose . 2  In the case of Kuhn v. Ogilvie"
the question was raised as to whether the provision of the Act of 1893
changed this rule arwd rendered her mortgage as security for the debt of an-
other invalid. The court concluded that it did not, on the ground that the
general intent of the act was plainly to enlarge her contractual capacity
and therefore nothing "less than explicit negative words should be construed
as narrowing powers admittedly possessed before the passage of the act.
' ' 4
The question of a transfer of her personal property as security for the
debt of another did not arise at common law, since by marriage her chattels
80215 Pa. 571 (1906).
sThe language of the court in Young's Estate, 234 Pa. 287 (1912) carries this moral
consideration theory to the point of absurdity. There a married woman was the accommo-
dation maker of a note, payable to her husband, for which the plaintiff advanced money to
the husband, knowing she was an accommodation maker. The husband became insane and,
upon the plaintiff's insistence, she gave a renewal note with a new indorser. The suit was
against the indorser and the court held the defendant liable on the warranty of indorsement
(see supra n. 66). Nothing more was before the court, but it nevertheless volunteered the
dictum that the wife was liable as maker-upon the theory that a moral obligation rested upon
her to pay the debt and hence when she gave the renewal note "a consideration moved
directly to her in the extension allowed her to redeem her moral obligation." (citing Rathfon
v. Locher). What is an extension of a moral obligation? What of the fact that her
first note was a promise to pay the debt of her husband and the second was a mere renewal
of that promise? By it she did not promise to pay her own debt, but the debt which her
husband incurred. If this is law the statute is worthless. All that the wife needs do to be liable
is to give her note as accommodation maker and then give a renewal note. The moral obli-
gation to pay th first note is consideration for her second promise and she is a principal;
i. e., she has no capacity to promise to pay the debt of another, but if she- promises twice she
is liable. Moral consideration may support a contract she has capacity to make, as in the
Rathfon case, but it can not support or validate an obligation she is legally incapacitated
from incurring.
82Hoover v. Samaritan Society, 4 Whart. 445 (1839); Haffey v. Carey, 73 Pa. 431
(1873).
83178 Pa. 303 (1896).
84Acc: Siebert v. Valley Nat, Bank, 186 Pa. 233 (1898); Righter v. Livingstone,
214 Pa. 28 (1906).
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automatically became the husband's. However, the Act of 18485 provided
that title to her property of any kind should not be divested by marriage and
it was thereafter held that she could assign her chattels or choses in action
as security for her husband's debt." The Act of 1893 could have no differ-
ent effect upon such a pledge of her personal property than upon'a mortgage
of her realty and the courts so heldsr In the case of Herr v. Reinoehl the
court explained the purpose of the act thus: "What the statute prohibits is
the incurring of a personal liability for the forbidden purpose, a liability
which carries the risk of a general judgment." '  So, to epitomize, a married
woman may pledge her property, but not her credit, for the debt of another.
To illustrate, where a bond and mortgage is given to secure the husband's
debt the mortgage is valid but the bond is void. 0  In this connection it
should be noted that if a married woman mortgages her property as security
for the debt of another and thereafter borrows money to pay off the mort-
gage debt and preclude foreclosure, she would be liable on this loan. She
would not be an accommodation party as to the loan, despite the fact that
the mortgage was originally given as surety, for the money is borrowed and
used by her in direct relief of her own debt and property in the foreclosure
suit.0 10
85Supra n. 2.
86Lytle's Appeal, 36 Pa. 131 (1860).
87Herr v. Reinoehl, 209 Pa. 483 (1904); Dusenberry v. Life Ins. Co., 188 Pa. 454
(1898); Bartholomew v. Allentown Nat. Bank, 260 Pa. 509 (1918).
88209 Pa. 483, 487.
sSSee Comm. Acceptance Corp. v. Ruppel, 295 Pa. 88 (1929).
s°See Alliance Finance Corp. v. Abrams, 97 Super. 528 (1929),
